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COMMITTEE AGENDA ITEM VI
NINTH CIRCUIT PROPOSAL TO REPEAL 28 U.S.C. Sl447(d)
DOCKET NO. 15

TO:

Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction,
Judicial Conference of the United States

FROM:

Hon. Roger J. Miner

SUBJECT:

Ninth Circuit Resolution Proposing Repeal of
28 u.s.c. § 1447(d)

RECOMMENDATION:

Reject Ninth Circuit Proposal

Report
The only information furnished to me regarding this agenda
item is that the Ninth Circuit has proposed the repeal of 28

u.s.c.
orders.

§

1447(d), dealing with the non-appealability of remand
I am given to believe that the Committee's predecessor

considered the issue a few years ago and, according to our
Chairman, "concluded that to allow appeals of remand orders would
be unworkable and bad policy."

A copy of the resolution was not

forwarded to me, and I therefore am unable to explain why the
Ninth Circuit favors repeal.
Section 1447(d) provides that "[a]n order remanding a case
to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on
appeal or otherwise," except for civil rights cases removed
pursuant to 28

u.s.c.

§ 1443.

The Supreme Court has limited this

restriction on review of remand orders by holding that "only
remand orders issued under

§

1447(c) and invoking the grounds

specified therein -- that removal was improvident and without
jurisdiction -- are immune from review under§ 1447(d)."
Thermtron Products, Inc. v. Hermanzdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 346

(1976).

In Thermtron, the district court remanded a properly

removed diversity case because of its "crowded docket," and the
Supreme Court held that mandamus was a proper remedy to correct
the error.

The Court found "no indication whatsoever that

Congress intended to extend the prohibition against review to
reach remand orders entered on grounds not provided by the
statute."

Id. at 350 ..

Review of a remand order therefore is

available, except in the case of an order issued pursuant to
1447(c).

See,~,

§

"Karl Koch Erecting Co . v. New York

Convention Center Dev. Corp., 838 F.2d 656, 658 (2d Cir. 1988)
(remand order based on district court's interpretation of forum
selection clause reviewable on appeal).
The statutory prohibition on review of remand orders granted
in cases removed from state courts improvidently and without
jurisdiction has appeared in many incarnations over the years,
dating back to the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552.
traces the statutory history, 423

u.s.

at 346-50, and succinctly

states the rationale for the present provision:
There is no doubt that in order to
prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases
by protracted litigation of jurisdictional
issues, United States v. Rice, 327 u. S., at
751, Congress immunized from all forms of
appellate review any remand order issued on
the grounds specified in§ 1447(c), whether
or not that order might be deemed erroneous
by an appellate court.
Id. at 351.
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Over a long period of time, Congressional policy has been
clear -- to permit actions to proceed in state courts after

§

1447(c) remand without the usual delays occasioned by appeals,
whether or not the district court determination was right or
wrong.

See Robertson v. Ball, 534 F.2d 63, 66 n.5 (5th Cir.

1976).

The policy is a sound one, advancing notions of comity,

federalism and confidence in our dual court structure.

See

generally Miner, The Tensions of a Dual Court System and Some
Prescriptions for Relief, 51 Alb. L. Rev. 151 (1987).

If by

reason of erroneous remand, "Federal questions arise in causes
pending in the state courts, those courts are perfectly competent
to decide them."

Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Fitzgerald, 160 U.S.

556, 583 (1896).

After remand, federal issues "must be litigated

in the state courts, and thence through the appropriate appellate
channels, ultimately to the Supreme Court if necessary."
Chandler v. O'Bryan, 445 F.2d 1045, 1057 (10th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972).
Finally, note should be taken of an observation made by the
Supreme Court regarding the purposes of one of the predecessors
of§ 1447(d):

"The general object of the act is to contract the

jurisdiction of the federal courts."

Employers Reinsurance Corp.

v. Bryant, 299 U.S. 374, 380 (1937).

In these days of constant

expansion of federal jurisdiction, with consequent geometric
increase in the federal caseload, the Chief Justice of the United
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States
jurisdiction.

seeking ways and means to cut back on federal
See Marcotte, Rehnquist: Cut Jurisdiction, ABA

Journal, Apr. 1989, at 22.

It seems strange that federal judges

would seek to repeal, rather than preserve, a statutory provision
that works well, serves a beneficent purpose, recognizes the
equality of our system of parallel judicial processes and reduces
the workload as well.

Section 1447(d) should be cherished and

preserved rather than condemned and repealed.

March 31, 1989
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